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ELECTION, DISSENT AND RENUNCIATION
W. BRYAN BOLICH*
In the assignment of topics for discussion at this Institute in connec-
tion with the new Intestate Succession Act it fell to my lot to present a
paper on election, dissent and renunciation. These words are polyseman-
tic-their meaning varying from state to state. For example, while most
of the statutes relating to dower or the spouse's forced share provide
that the surviving spouse may "elect," others say "renounce," "waive,"
"relinquish," "refuse," or "dissent from" the provisions of the decedent
spouse's will, and yet all mean the same thing.1 As in this state, so in
the others, each jurisdiction has its own definitions of these terms, but
they inevitably overlap. Under our meanings for example, the widow
who dissents both elects and renounces.
In this paper no exhaustive general treatment of the topics, election,
dissent and renunciation, will be attempted. Of necessity some general
discussion will occur, but the subject of this paper is the impact of the
Intestate Succession Act on these concepts. These will be discussed in
order, but with some inevitable overlapping.
A number of the act's provisions are new to this state, and while
there are some guides to decision from judicial utterances construing
the same or similar statutory provisions in other jurisdictions, it remains
for this act to be hammered out on the anvil of decided cases. Legisla-
tion is indeed a delicate art, and what the courts will do in fact by way
of interpretation of a statute often makes prediction a hazardous under-
taking.
ELECTION
Election has been succinctly defined as "the obligation imposed upon
a party to choose between two inconsistent or alternative rights or claims
in cases where there is a dear intention of the person from whom he
derives one that he should not enjoy both."-2 It thus presupposes a
plurality of rights or gifts; with an intention, express or implied, of the
person who has the right to control one or both, that one shall be a
* Professor of Law, Duke University. Professor Bolich wishes to acknowledge
the benefit which he received in the preparation of this paper from an unpublished
manuscript by Thomas L. Young, Assistant Attorney General of North Carolina,
entitled "Advancements, Renunciation and Dissent under the Intestate Succession
Act."3 VEmxnm, AmERIcAN FAmILY LAW § 205 (1935).
23 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE- § 1451 (1918); see Commercial Nat'l Bank
v. Misenheimer, 211 N.C. 519, 191 S.E. 14 (1937) ; Weeks v. Weeks, 77 N.C. 421(1877).
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substitute for the other; and is based upon the equitable principle that
one upon whom inconsistent rights are conferred may take either, but
cannot have both. The doctrine seems to have originated in a case where
a testator (T) devised A's property, Blackacre, to B, and devised his,
T's, own property, Whiteacre, to A. Thus .the theory and basis of
election: T must have intended A to acquiesce in the devise of Blackacre
to B if A is to keep his devise of Whiteacre from T. Therefore, A must
make an election: either relinquish his property to B, or claim his own
property and give up T's devise to him. It involves a problem of con-
struction of the language used in the light of the surrounding circum-
stances, and for an election to be called for the will must disclose a situa-
tion which puts the beneficiary to a choice between retaining his own
property or accepting the proffered devise or bequest in lieu thereof.
For example, if T devises to W a life estate in land which he owned in
fee simple with her as -a tenancy by the entireties and devises the re-
mainder therein to B she must make an election if T devises property of
his own to her,3 unless T mistakenly supposed himself to have a dis-
posable interest therein 3a or conferred no alternative benefit on W.8b If
put to an election W's acceptance of the devise to her of other land
owned by T, may constitute her implied election to accept this devise
and give up her interest in the tenancy by the entireties.
Thus the surviving spouse may be compelled, like any other devisee,
to elect between some benefit offered him by the will in lieu of a devise of
his property to others. However, it would seem that the statutory re-
quirement of dissent whereby the surviving spouse claims his non-
barrable intestate or forced share in the decedent's estate in lieu of the
will's provision for him is one thing, and the common law rule of
election which requires a surviving spouse whose property has been
devised to another either to retain this property or give up a voluntary
devise to him of property owned by the testator may be another.c It
seems that an election is not called for when the testator's alternative
"gift" in exchange for a devise of the survivor's property to another is
only that fraction of his estate of which the surviving spouse could not
be legally deprived without his consent.3d Common law dower and
curtesy created inchoate inter vivos rights in the land of the owning
spouse of which neither spouse could deprive the other by deed or will
without his consent and which became consummate upon the owner's
death if the other survived. In the days of dower if the husband pur-
ported to devise an unencumbered title in his land to another, he was
'Wacbovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Burrus, 230 N.C. 592, 55 S.E.2d 183 (1949).
"Benton v. Alexander, 224 N.C. 800, 32 S.E.2d 584 (1945).
" Lamb v. Lamb, 226 N.C. 662, 40 S.E.2d 29 (1946) ; Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 790(1958).
" See Tripp v. Nobles, 136 N.C. 99, 106, 48 S.E. 675, 677 (1904) (Walker, J.,
dissenting) ; Annot., 49 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1073, 1103 (1914).
a Bell v. Nye, 225 Ill. 283, 99 N.E. 610 (1912) ; Wright v. Wright, 154 Tex.
138, 274 S.W.2d 670 (1955).
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in theory devising away a property interest of his wife. If his will
made a separate provision for his widow, she was compelled to elect
between her dower and the other interest if it was found to be his intent
that the provision was in lieu of dower.4 But under most dissent statutes
the common law presumption favoring dower has been reversed, and a
husband's devise of his land presumptively excludes dower unless the
widow dissents from his will in the manner and within the time specified
by the statute.5
With the new act's abolition of common law dower and curtesy as to
persons dying on or after July 1, 1960, and the substitution of absolute
title in a forced share in the estate of the decedent in favor of the sur-
viving spouse, in theory no inter vivos interest is thereby created in the
survivor in the decedent's property. Therefore, when the decedent wills
his property to others than his surviving spouse it is no longer theo-
retically possible to say, as was true in case of dower, that an interest
in property belonging to the widow has been given to another so as to
put her to an election. The forced share concept created by the new
act merely secures to the survivor a designated interest in the decedent's
estate. If the decedent has failed to make a minimum provision for the
survivor, he is given a statutory right of dissent from the decedent's
will. Thus as to the forced share the traditional basis of election is not
precisely presented: the choice of surrendering some property right of
his in lieu of receiving another. It is rather a choice between alternative,
inconsistent courses of action: acquiescing in the will or taking against
it by filing a written statement of dissent with the clerk of the superior
court within six months of the will's probate in the manner prescribed
by the statute, failure to file as required by the statute being judicially
deemed an election to take under the will.6 The new act radically changes
the substantive statutory law of dissent, but as to the mechanics thereof
which affect election it makes no substantial change.7 It also creates a
new right of election in favor of the surviving spouse of an intestate and
the surviving spouse of a testator who dissents from the will to take a
life estate analogous to dower in lieu of the intestate or forced share by
filing a notice thereof in the form of a petition within six months after
the death of the decedent and in the same manner prescribed for filing
a dissent from the will, with failure so to file being conclusively deemed
by the statute a waiver of this right of election.8  The act broadens the
prior statute governing renunciation and requires it to be formally exe-
'Lee v. Giles, 161 N.C. 541, 77 S.E. 852 (1913) ; Annot., 171 A.L.R. 651 (1947).
'Bell v. Thurston, 214 N.C. 231, 199 S.E. 93 (1938); Craven v. Craven, 17
N.C. 339, 344 (1833) ; ATKINSON, WILLS § 33 (2d ed. 1953) ; 4 PAGE, WILLS § 1352
(Lifetime ed. 1941).
See generally ATKINSON, Wn.LS §§ 33, 138 (2d ed. 1953).TN.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 30-1 to -3 (Supp. 1959).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-30 (Supp. 1959).
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cuted and filed with the clerk of the superior court within one year of
ihe intestate's death, and in case it affects real estate to be recorded in
the local register of deeds office.8a In the interest of convenience the
remaining discussion of election will occur in connection with dissent
and renunciation, the major topics of this paper.
DISSENT
Introduction and General American Law
In effect, our system of laws permits, within limits, the perpetuation
of one's ownership of property beyond the grave. And with the excep-
tion of some forms of inter vivos conveyance which are in reality testa-
mentary, the persons to whom a decedent's property passes upon his
death are determined either by the laws of intestacy or the provisions
of his will. When during the feudal era society was organized upon the
basis of land holding in return for personal services, quite naturally the
tenant was not free to alienate or devise his land to whomsoever he saw
fit. Freedom of inter vivos conveyance was achieved through the
Statute of Quia Emptores (1290) and freedom of testation by the
Statute of Wills (1540), but neither form of transfer was complete
until the Statute of Tenures (1660) abolished military tenure. Since
personal property was not the subject of feudal tenure, the owner thereof
was allowed to transfer it both inter vivos and by testament. However,
its post mortem disposition having fallen under the jurisdiction of the
ecclesiastical courts instead of the common law courts in the church-state
struggle for jurisdiction, for centuries the laws of succession differed as
to real and personal property. Zealous that a man be permitted to devote
part of his property to pious uses and perform his Christian duty of
supporting his family, it became law that a man had freedom of testation
as to only one-third of his personal property. He was required to be-
queath at least one-third to his children and one-third to his widow,
Wvith the free third being customarily willed to the Church for absolution
of his soul. However, as to real property, freedom of testation was the
rule. And when the above doctrine of "reasonable parts" as to personal
property died out in England in the seventeenth century, the common
law countries lost this, civil law principle of compulsory provision for
dependents, and a testator could with impunity disinherit his heirs and
distributees. Only the marital estates of dower and curtesy afforded
one's family any legal protection against disinheritance. This became
the American system through our adoption of English law. It might
be rationalized as personal liberty of the individual, as the right to
accumulate and dispose of property within reasonable limits, as an inci-
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-10 (Supp. 1959).
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dent of ownership, or as a popular answer to the English common law
canons of descent of land which made a will for a man which no sane
man would ever make for himself. 9
In England and the Dominions modem legislation has now made
this type of thinking obsolete by statutes known as Family Provision
Acts. They illustrate the philosophy that as a parent is required to
support his family during his life so must he after death to the extent
of his available property. These statutes provide that the surviving
spouse or a dependent child may obtain maintenance out of the de-
cedent's estate if the court is of the opinion that the applicant's testate
or intestate share thereof is insufficient. This system avoids the rigid
forced share concept of the civil law, and by leaving the matter to ju-
dicial discretion permits tailor-made decrees as to disposition of one's
estate among dependents according to need.10 In the United States,
however, we still cling to the dower-curtesy principle of protecting by
law only the surviving spouse and let the rest of the family go.
Institutions of an age when land was the foundation of the economy,
primogeniture the rule of descent, and neither husband nor wife heir
of the other, dower and curtesy, by restricting freedom of both inter
vivos and testamentary transfer by the owner as against the other spouse,
afforded the survivor and children some measure of economic and social
security so long as the life-tenant parent lived and received the benefits.
But in our industrial economy of today both estates have become some-
thing of anachronisms because they fetter commerce in land and no
longer serve sufficiently the original protective purpose when principal
assets of the average estate are more often personal property than real
estate.'1 Therefore, there has developed in most states statutory con-
cepts which make husband and wife equal and preferred heirs of each
other and substitute for dower and curtesy a non-barrable right in the
surviving spouse to an absolute interest in a specified fraction of all the
property, both real and personal, owned by the deceased spouse at his
death. This forced share of the surviving spouse is protected against
testamentary disposal by giving the survivor a right to "dissent from,"
"elect against" or "renounce" the will of the decedent within a specified
time and take a certain share of his estate in lieu of the provision for
such survivor made by the will of the decedent. It is most often the
intestate share and therefore varies in amount according to circum-
stances, e.g., one-third if there are surviving descendants and one-half
' Atkinson, op. cit. supra note 6, §§ 3, 4; McMurray, Liberty of Testation. and
Some Modern Limitations Thereon, 14 ILL. L. REv. 96 (1919) ; Nussbaum, Liberty
of Testation, 23 A.B.A.J. 183 (1937).
"0 Crane, Family Provision in England, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 984 (1960) ; Dainow,
Restricted Testation in New Zealand, Australia and Canada, 36 Micir. L. REv.
1107 (1938).112 POWELL, REAL PROPETY 111212-19 (1950).
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if there are none, or all of the estate up to a designated amount plus
a fraction of the balance, or the equivalent of dower in a few states with
some share of the personal property. This right of election may be
lost by failure properly to exercise it as provided by the statute, by
express waiver, or by acceptance of benefits under the will.
12
Since this forced share is a fraction of the decedent's probate estate
it gives one spouse no inter vivos interest in the other's property. There-
fore this property is generally subject to the claims of the owner's credi-
tors and is vulnerable to his sole inter vivos transfers. Thus it differs
radically from common law dower and curtesy which could not be barred
without the other spouse's consent. Of course, the forced share could
be safe-guarded by requiring one spouse's release or joinder in all trans-
fers of the other's property in order to bar it.12 1 While such joinder in
conveyances of land with their usual requirements of writing and re-
cording greatly impairs marketability of real estate, its requirement as
to all transfers of personal property in order to assure a good title as
against the surviving spouse would constitute an intolerable burden on
commerce. Thus a spiteful spouse may by unilateral act cut off the sur-
vivor by simply giving away his property during his lifetime, but in
most cases self-interest against impoverishment is usually a sufficient
deterrent. It is general law that voluntary conveyances of property
made by one spouse with intent to defeat the other spouse's marital
rights such as dower or curtesy may be set aside as fraudulent to the
extent of such interest.1 3  And by analogy to the judicial remedies
afforded these marital property rights courts do protect the surviving
spouse's statutory share. Secret pre-nuptial gifts made with intent to
defeat the forced share are voidable,1 4 and post-nuptial transfers may
generally be set aside except sales and exchanges for fair value and bona
fide gifts.I5 Some courts set aside a gift as fraudulent if made with the
intent of depriving the survivor of such interest in the estate of the
"ATKINSON, op. cit. supra note 6, §33; MODEL PROBATE CODE §32 (Simes
1946) ; 6 PowEL., op. cit. supra note 11, 111 971, 995; 3 VFaNinm, op. cit. supra note
1, §§ 189, 199, 205, 216; Phelps, The Widow's Right of Election in the Estate of
Her Husband, 37 MICH. L. Rrv. 236, 401 (1938-1939) ; Sayre, Husband and Wife
as Statutory Heirs, 42 HAav. L. REv. 330 (1929). In Phipps, Marital Property
Rights, 27 RocKY MT. L. REv. 180, 191 (1955), will be found a resum6 of the
American statutes governing marital forced succession.
'D.C. CODE ANN. §18-201a (1951).
" Blevins v. Pittman, 189 Ga. 789, 7 S.E2d 662 (1940) ; Szambothy v. Mertz,
347 Mo. 776, 148 S.W.2d 1028 (1941) ; White v. White, 212 S.C. 440, 48 S.E.2d
189 (1948). Contra, Mark v. Mark, 145 Ohio St. 341, 61 N.E.2d 595 (1945).1
" Martin v. Martin, 282 Ky. 411, 138 S.W.2d 509, 54 HARv. L. REa. 336 (1940);
Granger v. Granger, 296 Mich. 357, 296 N.W. 288, 40 MICE. L. REv. 300 (1941).
"6 Bensing, Inter Vivos Trusts and the Election Rights of a Surviving Spouse,
42 Ky. L.J. 616 (1954) ; Annot., 64 A.L.R., 466 (1929) ; Annot., 79 A.L.R. 377
(1932); Annot., 112 A.L.R. 649 (1938); Annot., 49 A.L.R. 2d 521 (1956).
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other or as illusory because a mere mask for retention of ownership.16
Other gifts fall within a twilight zone of uncertainty. Obviously, these
forced share statutes create more than a mere expectancy and declare
a sound public policy against disherison of the surviving spouse, but
they restrict only testamentary disposal and their usual silence as to
inter vivos transfer leaves it to the courts to decide which of such trans-
actions shall be nullified to protect the surviving spouse.
The uncertainty and unsuitability of these tests in resolving the
conflict of policies between an owner's power of unencumbered transfer
of his property and the protection of his surviving spouse against dis-
herison has motivated a number of suggestions for statutory solutions.17
The Model Probate Code permits the surviving spouse who dissents to
treat the decedent's inter vivos gifts as if they were testamentary dispo-
sitions and to recover them from the donees if made "in fraud of the
marital rights" of the survivor in the decedent's estate; and it also
creates a prima facie presumption that gifts made within two years of
death are fraudulent.18 One writer in effect suggests a statute analogiz-
ing the estate of the decedent to which the survivor's right of dissent
attaches to the gross estate concept of the Internal Revenue Code, and
he proposes that "except for rights of bona fide purchasers for value,
transfers made (a) subject to the enjoyment or control of the decedent
or (b) with intent to diminish or defeat the rights of his dependents
should be judicially voidable."' 9  The inclusiveness and relative cer-
tainty of the federal estate tax gross estate concept and its terms make
it a good device whereby to define the estate of the decedent subject to
the rights of the surviving spouse. While not perfect for the purpose, its
use would simplify matters because the tax report would serve both
purposes and also it would solve most of the questions stemming from
the decedent's use of such typical devices as survivorship interests, inter
vivos trusts, life insurance, gifts in contemplation of death and powers
of appointment to reduce the size of his estate as to both his surviving
spouse and the fisc.20 And if the primary purpose of such a law is to
provide for the survivor's support, it should apply equally whether
the decedent dies testate or intestate because he can as easily pauperize
the survivor by giving away all his property and dying intestate as by
" Martin v. Martin, 282 Ky. 411, 138 S.W.2d 509, 54 HARv. L. R-v. 336 (1940);
Granger v. Granger, 296 Mich. 357, 296 N.W. 288, 40 MIcH. L. Rv. 300 (1941);
Annots., 64 A.L.R. 466 (1929); 79 A.L.R. 377 (1932); 112 A.L.R. 649 (1938).
See generally ATKINSON, op. cit. supra note 6, §32. And see RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY §316 (1940), for a comparison of this forced share with an ordinary
expectancy.
7 See ATKINSON, op. cit. supra note 6, § 33; Calm, Restraints on Disinheritance,
85 U. PA. L. Rav. 139 (1936) ; Note, 27 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 306 (1952).
'
8 
MODEL PROBATE CODE § 33 (Simes 1946).
" Cahn, supra note 17, at 153.
"Note, 27 N.Y.U.L. REv. 306, 312 (1952).
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retaining it and leaving it by will to others. And since certain gifts
from the decedent to third persons remain part of the decedent's estate
for purposes of determining the survivor's non-barrable share, it seems
arguable that where the survivor has benefitted by similar gifts from
the decedent such property should be counted toward this share, i.e.,
brought into hotchpot by analogy to the rule as to advancements.
The law of other states protecting the survivor's forced share has
been discussed with some fullness because our act, like most of the other
forced share statutes, contains no provisions protecting the survivor's
share against inter vivos conveyances by the owning spouse. However
the elective life estate available to the survivor in lieu of his forced share
protects him against inter vivos conveyances of the decedent's real
property, but not personal property, so the law of other states as above
discussed could be useful when such problems arise under our new act.
Law of North Carolina
A. Prior to July 1, 1960
Since the revolutionary property emancipation of the wife by the
basic constitutional and statutory enactments of 1868, and prior to the
new Intestate Succession Act, the principal inter-spousal property rights
relevant to this paper are substantially as follows: both husband and
wife are the individual owners of all property separately acquired by
each before and during the marriage; the wife has common law dower
in all estates of inheritance owned by her husband at any time during
the coverture, which cannot be taken by his creditors, or barred without
her consent by the husband's conveyance, inter vivos or testamentary;
the husband no longer has common.law curtesy initiate in his wife's lands
and has curtesy consummate only if she dies intestate thereto; the wife's
common law disability to make a will has been removed but her con-
veyance of her land is void without her sane husband's written assent;
on intestacy each may be heir and distributee of the other, with the
widow being entitled to her year's allowance; and by legislation begin-
ning in 1784 the widow may dissent from her husband's will and thereby
take in lieu of its provisions for her the same rights in his real and per-
sonal estate as if he had died intestate, i.e., dower, distributive share and
a year's allowance.21 The 1784 statute affected dower in two far-reaching
ways: it was from 1784 until 1868 confined to lands owned by the hus-
band at his death and it in effect reversed the common law presumption
that the husband's testamentary provision for his widow was a bounty
in addition to dower unless the will clearly expressed a contrary intent
"See DOUGLAs, ADMINISTRATION OF EsTATEs IN NORTH CAROLINA §§ 21, 39,
169-175.1 (curtesy), 18, 39, 48, 158 (dissent), 20, 157-168 (dower), 27, 28, 232
(descent), 26, 28, 234, 235 (distribution), 19, 145-156 (year's allowance) (1948);
MORDECAI, LAw L rU S 291-96, 360-62, 370-90, 1350-51 (2d ed. 1915).
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or the provision itself was not consistent with dower. As to dissent the
statute provided that a widow whose husband makes a provision for her
out of his personal estate is not entitled to dower unless she dissents
from his will within six months. 21a This clause requiring dissent if
the husband provided for his widow from his personal estate was sub-
sequently removed.
As the law of dissent stood in 1959 by express terms of the statutes
a husband could not by will bar his widow from taking dower and other
intestate rights in his estate to which she was otherwise entitled if
within six months from its probate she filed with the clerk of the superior
court a dissent to his will. Her dissent could be filed in person or by
attorney, and if she has an infant or insane, by her guardian. If she
dissented and took dower it was not subject to the claims of her hus-
band's creditors. And the same was true for her life to the amount of
her dower right in lands he devised to her even if she did not dissent.2 2
Judicial decisions interpreting these statutes have filled in certain
important details in establishing the legislative intent. The statute is
one of limitation allowing a maximum of six months from probate to
ascertain the condition of the estate and file a dissent, which election is
binding when so made if it is not induced by misrepresentation or caused
by mistake.23  Failure to dissent within the time allowed constitutes an
implied election to take under the will and generally precludes dissent;
but this period may be extended where a caveat is filed, or an insanity
involved, and dower even allowed without a dissent when the estate
proves to be insolvent. 24 The effect of a dissent is to cause the testator
to die intestate as to his widow, but in other respects the will stands. 25
In determining the amount of her intestate share advancements made by
him are brought in.26
B. Subsequent to July 1, 1960.
With regard to the privilege of dissent, the Intestate Succession Act
makes some material changes in the law relating to the rights of a sur-
viving spouse in the property and estate of the decedent which it seems
desirable to summarize before considering details. Prior to this act a
"'R Craven v. Craven, 17 N.C. 339 (1833).2 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 30-1 to -3 (1950) [N.C. Pub. Laws 1868-69, ch. 93, §§ 37,
38, 34, as amended]. See generally MORDFCAI, op. cit. supra note 21, 383-84.
" Whitted v. Wade, 247 N.C. 81, 100 S.E.2d 263 (1957) ; Union Natl Bank v.
Easterby, 236 N.C. 599, 73 S.E.2d 541 (1952); Richardson v. Justice, 125 N.C.
409, 34 S.E. 441 (1899) ; Horton v. Lee, 99 N.C. 227, 5 S.E. 404 (1888) ; Notes,
23 N.C.L. REv. 380 (1945), 35 N.C.L. REv. 520 (1957).
"' Whitted v. Wade, supra note 23; Atlantic Trust & Banking Co. v. Stone, 176
N.C. 270, 97 S.E. 8 (1918) ; Perkins v. Brinkley, 133 N.C. 86, 45 S.E. 465 (1903);
Yorkly v. Stinson, 97 N.C. 236, 1 S.E. 452 (1887).
" Murphy v. Murphy, 125 Fla. 855, 170 So. 856 (1936); Wachovia Bank &
Trust Co. v. Green, 236 N.C. 654, 73 S.E.2d 879, 31 N.C.L. R-v. 491 (1953).
" Arrington v. Dortch, 77 N.C. 367 (1877).
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husband was not permitted to dissent from his wife's will, but a widow
could under the statute at her whim or caprice dissent from his will and
take her intestate rights in his estate. Now both husband and wife have
reciprocal rights of 'dissent, but this right and its reward are no longer
statutorily unqualified. It exists only when the survivor receives less
than half of the testator's estate as defined by the act, and in certain
cases the dissenter does not receive the whole intestate share. In lieu
of the will's provision the dissenter gets his intestate share up to a
maximum of one-half of the estate or at his election a life estate analo-
gous to dower. However, these amounts are cut in half if the dissenter
is the second or successive spouse of a decedent who is survived by issue,
none of whom are also issue of the dissenter.27
In its treatment of dower and curtesy the act follows the Model Pro-
bate Code and the general pattern of marital property legislation in a
majority of American jurisdictions by abolishing these ancient relics of
yesterday's agrarian society, giving husband and wife equal forced shares
in each other's estate and protecting this share by according to the
survivor the right to dissent from the decedent's will and take absolute
title to a specified portion of the decedent's estate. Relatively unique
features of this act are two: the right of election which permits the
survivor in lieu of this share to take a life estate analogous to dower in
one-third of the real estate, including the dwelling and its household
funishings even though this inclusion produces an excess above the
one-third limitation; and the proviso which halves the dissenter's rights
in some cases of the second or successive spouse of the decedent.28
1. Constitutionality
Two of the most important changes effected by this act, which applies
"only to estates of persons dying on or after July 1, 1960," are its aboli-
tion of dower and curtesy and its abridgement of a wife's power to make
a will disinheriting her husband by giving him a right to dissent from
her will. And since their constitutionalty may be raised, it is proposed
to discuss this at the outset. By the great weight of authority inchoate
dower, not being a vested property right, may at any time prior to the
husband's death be abridged or abolished.29 As to curtesy initiate, if it
still exists in this state after the adoption of the Constitution of 1868,
"' N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-4, -14, -30, 30-1 to -3 (Supp. 1959).
2 S ATKINsoN, op. cit. supra note 6, § 33; MODEL PROBATE CODE, op. cit. supra
note 12, §§ 22, 31, 32; 2 POWELL, op. cit. mspra note 11, 1 212-19; 6 POWELL, op,
cit. stpra note 11, 11971, 995; 3 VERNrER, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 188, 189, 199,
205, 216; Phelps, supra note 12; Sayre, supra note 12.
F- Randall v. Krieger, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 137 (1874); Griswold v. Magee, 102
Minn. 114, 112 N.W. 1020 (1907); Annot., 20 A.L.R. 1330 (1922). Contra,
Walker v. Bennett, 107 N.J. Eq. 151, 152 Ati. 9 (1930) ; O'Kelley v. Williams, 84
N.C. 241 (1881). See generally ScuRocx, RETRoACrivE LEGi.SLATiON ATECTINao
INTEREsTs iN LAND 285 (1953).
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the same is true.30 Article X, § 6 of this Constitution erased the ancient
dogma of the common law that as to property husband and wife are one
and he is that one, and established for a married woman the ownership
and control of her separate property; and as to the jws disponendi
thereof provides that it "may be devised and bequeathed, and, with the
written assent of her husband, conveyed by her as if she were unmar-
ried." This language poses the question whether this statute which
extends to the husband the right to dissent from his wife's will, a right
that she was given in 1784 as to his will, is an unconstitutional legisla-
tive abridgement of the above grant of freedom of testation by virtue of
which it has heretofore been held that a married woman may by will
deprive her surviving husband of all interest in her estate, including
.curtesy.3 1
The specific purpose of the above-quoted constitutional provision
was to remove the common law testamentary disability of a married
woman and to confer upon her the same right as a man or unmarried
woman to dispose of her property by will; and with her husband's writ-
ten assent to transfer it inter vivos. In a leading case construing the
above constitutional provision, it was contended that a statute, which
declared that when a parent's will makes no provision as to an after-
born child the testatrix dies intestate as to such child, was an unconsti-
tutional abridgement of a married woman's right of testation. In holding
this statute valid the court pointed out that it did not void the whole
will and that it was valid except as to such after-born child. The opinion
said the
right to dispose of property by will is a conventional rather than
an inherent right, and its regulation rests largely with the Legis-
lature except where and to the extent that same is restricted by
constitutional inhibition....
Being properly advertent to this principle, a perusal of the
section relied upon will disclose that its principal purpose . . .
was to remove to the extent stated the common-law restrictions
on the right of married women to convey their property and dis-
pose of same by will, and was not intended to confer on them
the right to make wills freed from any and all legislative regu-
lation.3 2
The matter of a dissent falls squarely within the reasoning of the
above case because a dissent to a will does not render it void but merely
" Hallyburton v. Slagle, 132 N.C. 947, 44 S.E. 655 (1903) ; Walker v. Long,
109 N.C. 510, 14 S.E. 299 (1891) ; Alexander v. Alexander, 85 Va. 353, 7 S.E. 335(1888) ; MORDECAI, op. cit. supra note 21, §§ 387-89; see ScuRLocK, op. cit. sujra
note 29, at 279.
" Watts v. Griffin, 137 N.C. 572, 50 S.E. 218 (1905) ; Hallyburton v. Slagle,
supra note 30; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-16 (1950) [N.C. Pub. Laws 1871-72, ch. 193§ 301.
" Flanner v. Flanner, 160 N.C. 126, 129, 75 S.E. 936, 937 (1912) ; see Annot.,
29 A.L.R. 1338 (1924).
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upsets it as to the dissenter;83 and the new act specifically so provides in
declaring as follows: "the residue of the testator's net estate .. shall
be distributed to the other devisees and legatees as provided in the testa-
tor's last will ... ."34 And as stated, it is felt that this act's change of
the law so as to give husband and wife equal forced shares in each other's
estates and reciprocal rights of dissent, as now exist in many other states
despite Married Women's Property Acts empowering the wife to will
her property as if sole, constitutes merely a reasonable regulation of a
married woman's constitutionally conferred power of testation and is
therefore valid, although there are earlier North Carolina decisions
which point to the contrary.8 5
That the provisions of Article X, § 6 are not immune to legislative
alteration is further proved by the fact that its requirement that the wife's
inter vivos conveyance of her property have her husband's written assent
has been similarly regulated by statutes making the wife a free trader.
and dispensing with the necessity of such joinder of the husband in
cases of certain leases of her realty, legal separation, abandonment by
the husband, and his insanity, all of which have been upheld as valid
legislative limitations on Article X, § 6,86 which has also been restated
and otherwise implemented by statute.37
By the Intestate Succession Act's abolition of dower all legal restraint
by the wife over her husband's freedom of inter vivos conveyance of his
land disappeared, while such conveyances of hers were, subject to the
above-mentioned exceptions, void unless signed by him. Under these
circumstances the General Statutes Commission realized the desirability
of finding an acceptable substitute for dower compatible with this state's
traditional policies of freedom of alienation of land and protection of
the home. In practically all states there are homestead laws, the primary
purpose of which is to protect the family home against creditors and sole
conveyances of the owning spouse; and most of these are so phrased in
terms of acreage or monetary value as to accomplish this purpose.8 8 But
unfortunately the North Carolina provisions are hopelessly inadequate
because of their maximum of one thousand dollars as to real property
and five hundred as to personal property, and their lack of confinement
" Murphy v. Murphy, 125 Fla. 885, 170 So. 856 (1936); Wachovia Bank &
Trust Co. v. Green, 236 N.C. 654, 73 S.E.2d 879, 31 N.C.L. REv. 491 (1953);
Annot., 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 602 (1910).
"
4N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3 (c) (Supp. 1959).
" Tiddy v. Graves, M2 N.C. 620, 75 S.E. 936 (1900) ; 6 PowEL.L, op. cit. supra
note 11, f 970 n. 30; 3 VERNIER, op. cit. supra note 1, § 216; Annot., 29 A.L.R.
1338 (1924) ; see MoRDEcAI, op. cit. .upra note 21, at 377.
" Keys v. Tuten, 199 N.C. 368, 154 S.E. 631 (1930) ; Lancaster v. Lancaster,
178 N.C. 22, 100 S.E. 120 (1919); Vann v. Edwards, 135 N.C. 661, 47 S.E. 784
(1904) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-4 to -6 (1950).
' N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-1 to -3, -7, -8 (1950).
"6 POWELL, op. cit. supra note 11, 11263, 970; 3 VERNIER, op. Cit. supra note 1,§228.
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to land used as the home. 89 It was recognized that the widely prevalent
custom of home ownership in this state through the use of tenancy by
the entireties with its protective features as to creditors and sole con-
veyances of the spouses tempers the loss of dower and inadequacy of
our homestead laws. In this situation the Commission felt that com-
merce in land would be facilitated and the wife adequately protected if
the family home could not be conveyed without her joinder. Attention
was therefore focused upon our homesite statute 0 which was enacted
in 1919 in order to protect the inchoate right of dower and prohibit the
sale of the home by the husband without the written consent of the wife.
A study of this act, which was repealed in 1959, disclosed that it was
largely a dead letter and would not serve the purpose because of both
the insufficiency of its provisions and the uncertainty of some of them,
including the basic definition of "homesite." 41 A new homesite statute
was accordingly drafted and submitted to the legislature in 1959 as a
companion statute to the Intestate Succession Act under the title of "An
Act To Provide for the Creation of and To Limit the Conveyance of
Family Homesites."'
Essentially, it protected only the homesite from unilateral conveyance
by the owner, and, subject to the constitutional requirement of a hus-
band's written assent to validate the wife's conveyances, made both
spouses free traders as to the remainder of their land. It established a
special proceeding to determine whether particular land was homesite,
and also permitted husband and wife to designate their principal home-
site by contract with provision for registration of such contracts and
decrees.42 This proposed statute met with determined opposition largely
because of its possible adverse effect on real estate law and practice, in-
cluding title search, and was not adopted. Extended study and delibera-
tion resulted in the enactment of a substitute proposal as an amendment
to the Intestate Succession Act. This allows the surviving spouse to
elect a life estate analogous to dower in lieu of the intestate share, and
in case of testacy and dissent, to elect this life estate in lieu of the allow-
able intestate or other specified share of the decedent's estate.43
2. Right of Dissent
This act effects a significant change of law as to the right of dissent
by extending the privilege to the husband and by so qualifying it that
11 N.C. Coxsr. art. X, §§ 1, 2, 3, 5, 8; N.G. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-369 to -392 (1950).
"See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-8 (1950) [N.C. Sess. Laws 1945, ch. 73, § 2].
"'See Boyd v. Brooks, 197 N.C. 644, 150 S.E. 178 (1929); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§30-8 (Supp. 1959) ; McCall & Langston, A New Intestate Succession Statute for
North Carolina, 11 N.C.L. R-v. 266, 270-76 (1933) ; Proposals for Legislation in
North Carolina, 11 N.C.L. REv. 50, 64-68 (1932).
42 See S. 103, Session 1959.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-30 (Supp. 1959).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the decedent can bar a dissent and thereby prevent his will from being
upset. The survivor may not dissent "if he or she receives one half or
more in value of all the property passing upon the death of the testator,
including both that property passing under the will and that property
passing in any manner outside the will as a result of the death of the
testator.' ' 43 a And there is expressly included in this computation: one-
half of the value of any property passing by survivorship to the survivor,
and the value of life insurance on the decedent's life received by the
survivor to the extent that neither the survivor nor anyone in his behalf
paid the premiums thereon. Under the statutes of most states the sur-
viving spouse has carte blanche to dissent, but a few others in addition
to North Carolina qualify the right.44 This statute declares a policy:
so long as the testator makes a certain minimum provision for his sur-
viving spouse the law recognizes his privilege to give the remainder of
his property to others by his will. It is designed as a protection of the
survivor against harsh property dispositions but also seeks to prevent
him from getting the lion's share by technical jockeying which might
unduly restrict freedom of testation by preventing the testator from
benefitting such objects of his bounty as his other kin and favorite
charities. In other words, if the survivor receives at least one-half of
the decedent's estate by deed, will or contract this is irrebutably deemed
to be in lieu of the statutory right unless the will states that the survivor
is to have both; but if less than one-half is so received it is deemed to be
in lieu of the statutory right unless he rebuts this presumption by a dis-
sent from the will filed within apt time. As a matter of inter-spousal
estate planning and disposition much use is made of life insurance, inter
vivos transfers both in trust and outright, and co-ownership of property
by husband and wife with survivorship such as joint bank accounts,
-stocks and bonds, and tenancy by the entireties as to the home. Thus
it would be quite improper for dissent purposes to exclude such property
:which passes by gift to the survivor from the decedent in computing the
value of the latter's estate and thereby permit the survivor to dissent and
also get his forced share of the probate estate. However, the statute
could operate with equal unfairness when the survivor happens to be
the one who paid for the property. Therefore, such survivorship prope rI
should be treated as part of the decedent's estate only to the extent that
the survivor did not contribute to its acquisition.4"
.. " N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1(b) (Supp. 1959).
S" CoLo. Rsv. STAT. AxN. § 152-5-5 (1955); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59
-602(2), -603 (Supp. 1955); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2382 (Dart 1945); Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 667-670 (1954); N.Y. DEck. EsT. LAw § 18; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30
1 (Supp. 1959).
"' See INT. Rsv. CoDE of 1954, § 811(e).
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3. Time and Manner of Dissent
The mechanics of dissent under the .act follow the prior law by re-
quiring it to be filed with the clerk of the court of probate of the will
within six months thereafter and permitting it to be made in person, by
attorney or by guardian. The act adds the provision that the attested
written authority of the attorney be acknowledged, permits a dissent by
the general guardian or guardian of the person or property and by a
next friend if the survivor has no guardian. In so far as the prior
statutes remain unchanged by this act the body of judicial decision con-
struing the statutes as previously outlined would appear to remain
trustworthy.
46
In most all states the surviving spouse is given statutory right of
election between the provisions made in the will and some law-given
interest in the decedent's property and estate. The statutory procedure
is generally exclusive, and failure to take the prescribed affirmative
action generally waives the right and constitutes an election to take
under the will. 47 This result could be very disadvantageous when the
estate debts are large or the will's provision small. This right of election
is usually classified as a choice between alternative benefits, but where the
will makes no provision for the survivor, it is rather a choice between
two courses of action: departing from or abiding by the testator's dis-
position of his property.48  In addition to waiver by failure to dissent,
the right may be barred by certain misconduct of the survivor ;49 and by
ante-nuptial and post-nuptial agreement of the spouses, provided the
contract is fairly made and the consideration adequate, the statutory
rights protected by a dissent may be barred.50 And the same is true of
acts in pais by way of estoppel.51 Our statutory period of six months
for a dissent seems short for making an intelligent choice, and a better
period might be not later than one month after expiration of the allow-
able time for creditors of the estate to file claims.52
While our statute states in detail the requirements for and effects of
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-2 (Supp. 1959) ; materials cited supra notes 22-26.
Davey v. Weber, 133 Colo. 365, 295 P,2d 688 (1956) ; Kreamer v. Hitchcock,
207 Md. 454, 115 A2d 255 (1955); 4 PAGE, op. cit. supra note 5, §§ 1352-54: 3
VERNIE, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 205-07; see Perkins v. Brinkley, 133 N.C. 86, 45
S.E . 45(1903).
" Kiel v. Smith, 136 Kan. 522, 16 P.2d 538 (1932); In re Lottman's Estate,
145 Misc. 839, 261 N.Y.S. 400 (Surr. Ct. 1932).
"0N.C. GEN. STAT. §§28-10 to -12, -19, -20 (1950) [28-10 to -12: N.C. Pub.
Laws 1871-72, ch. 193, §§ 42-45, as amended; -19: N.C. Pub. Laws 1941, ch. 243;
-20: N.C. Pub. Laws 1868-69, ch. 113 § 6]; 3 VERNIER, op. cit. supra note 1, § 202.8o N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-12, -13 (Supp. 1959) ; ATKINSON, op. cit. supra note
6, § 31; Powell, § 216 Amots., 2 L.R.A. 372 (1899), 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 953 (1907),
49 A.L.R. 116 (1927) ; see MODEL PROBATE CODE, op. cit. supra note 12, § 39.
"
1See Yorkly v. Stinson, 97 N.C. 236, 1 S.E. 452 (1887) ; Annots., 82 A.L.R.
1509 (1933), 166 A.L.R 316 (1947).
" ATKINSON, op. cit. supra note 6, § 33; see Ax. STAT. ANN. § 60-503 (1955);
MODEL PROBATE CODE, op. cit. supra note 12, § 35.
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a dissent, it is silent as to what constitutes and is the effect of an election
to take under the will, leaving this in the main to judicial legislation.58
By majority rule the effect of an election to take under the will, either
by express action or by failure to take the affirmative action required
by the dissent statute, is to bar all intestate rights of the survivor in the
decedent's property passing under the will to other beneficiaries and out-
side of it, as by partial intestacy. This result is sometimes supported on
the reasoning that one may not both accept and reject a will, and having
accepted the testamentary benefit the taker is barred from participating
in the intestate property.54  But by the better reasoning this involves
no violation of the election doctrine that one may not claim under an
instrument without giving full effect to it in every respect because the
intestate property passes under the intestate statutes and not by the
will. Therefore such a taking is no denial of the instrument. 5  Also,
he who dissents and thereby takes against the will is generally entitled
to his full share of the intestate property, including that as to which the
testator died partially intestate.50
4. Effect of Dissent
Under the statute in effect and operative as to persons dying prior to
July 1, 1960, the effect of a dissent was to give the widow the same
rights and estates in the real and personal property of her husband as
if he had died intestate, i.e., dower, year's allowance, and intestate share.57
Under the new act the surviving spouse who dissents is entitled to his
intestate share except that when the decedent is not survived by issue or
a parent and the surviving spouse would otherwise take the entire net
estate, he is limited to one-half of the estate calculated before payment
of federal estate tax and free of such tax, and if the survivor is a widow
she may also get her year's allowance.58  Both the act's provisions quali-
fying the right of dissent in all cases by confining it to situations where
the survivor does not receive by deed, contract or will at least one-half
"N.C. Gmr. STAT. §§30-1 to -3 (Supp. 1959); see MODEL PRORATE CODE, op.
cit. suPra note 12, § 40; Phelps, supra note 12, at 255, 427.
"hBunker v. Bunker, 130 Me. 103, 154 A . 73 (1933) ; Ford v. Whedbee, 21
N.C. 16 (1834):; 1 AMC AN LAw oF PROPERTY § 5.41 (Casner ed. 1952); Annot.,
93 A.L.R. 1384 (1934).
"wTilton v. Tilton, 382 Il. 426, 47 N.E2d 453 (1943) ; Redmond v. Coffin, 17N.C. 437, 447 (1833) ; and see Phelps, rupra note 12, at 269-72.
Cain v. Barwell, 125 Miss. 123, 87 So. 481 (1921) ; Phelps, supra note 12,
at 255.
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§28-149 29-1(8), 30-2 to -5, -15 (1950) [28-149: N.C.
Pub. Laws 1868-69, chi. 113, § 93, as amended; 29-1(8): N.C. Pub. Laws 1925,
chi. 7; 30-2; N.C. Pub. Laws 1868-69, ch. 93, § 38; -3; N.C. Laws 1791, ch. 351, § 4,
as amended; -4: N.C. Pub. Laws 1871-72, ch. 193, § 44; -5: N.C. Laws 1827, chi. 46.
as amended; -15: N.C. Pub. Laws 1868-69, ch. 93, as amended]; Cheshire v.
Drewry, 213 N.C. 450, 197 S.E. 1 (1938); Drewry v. Raleigh Say. Bank & Trust
Co., 173 N.C. 664, 92 S.E. 593 (1917) ; DOUGLAS, op. cit. supra note 21, §§ 18,
48 (c).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-14 (4), 30-3 (a), -15 (Supp. 1959).
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of the decedent's property passing at his death, and that limiting the
dissenter to a maximum of one-half of the "gross estate" where the
decedent leaves no issue or parent constitute a double restriction on
dissent and are designed to prevent unfair or capricious dissents and to
foster freedom of testation as previously suggested. The same or similar
provisions qualifying the right of dissent and setting a top percentage of
the intestate share receivable, exist in the statutory law of dissent of some
of the other states, with the Model Probate Code having only the latter.59
In the absence of this provision confining the dissenter in this situa-
tion to a maximum of one-half of the intesiate share the surviving spouse
who had received any fraction less than the disqualifying one-half of
the decedent's property passing at his death could dissent and take the
whole estate regardless of the adequacy of inter vivos or testamentary
provision for him, or the needs or deserts of the other relatives of the
testator who were beneficiaries under his will. However, the dis-
senter's share being computed before and being free of the federal estate
tax assures the maximum marital deduction, unless a nonqualifying life
estate is elected, and may in some situations put a premium on dis-
senting by increasing the value of the dissenter's bounty to the detriment
of the other beneficiaries under the will. 60
In case the dissenting spouse is a second or successive spouse of a
decedent who is survived by issue, none of whom are also issue of the
dissenter, he or she takes only one-half of the amount provided by this
act. 1 This limitation on the amount of a dissenter may receive could
have either or both of two objectives: fostering freedom of testation or
discouraging multiple marriages by making it financially less desirable
to marry a widow or widower with issue by a prior marriage. Similar
limitations exist in a few other states.6 2 The application of this limita-
tion to G.S. § 29-30 where the dissenting spouse elects instead of the
intestate share a life estate in one-third of the decedent's real estate,
including without regard to value the dwelling house and household
furnishings, might be awkward. Would it be a life estate in one-sixth,
including the dwelling and furnishings regardless of -value?
As to the effects of a dissent on the will it is provided that it does
" CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 152-5-5 (1955); ILL. STAT. ANN. § 110.264 (Jones
1955) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-301 (1955) ; Ky. RRv. STAT. § 392.080 (Supp. 1957) ;
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 191, § 15 (1955); MIcH. ComP. LAWS §702.69 (Supp.
1954); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.160 (1956); N.Y. DEcED. EST. LAW § 18.1; TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 31-606, -608 (1956) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4091 (1955) ; see MODEL
PRO3ATE CODE, op. cit. supra note 12, § 32; Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 147 (1954). For
qualification of right of dissent, see statutes cited note 44 sup ra.
" See Note, 31 N.C.L. REv. 491 (1953), commenting on Wachovia Bank &
Trust Co. v. Green, 236 N.C. 654, 73 S.E2d 879 (1953) ; Westfall, Estate Planning
and the Widow's Election, 71 HAgv. L. Rtv. 1269, 1287 (1958).
"
1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3(b) (Supp. 1959).
" IND. STAT. ANN. § 6-301 (Bums 1955); Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN. § 6-301
(1955).
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not void the will and that the residue of the property not taken by the
dissenter shall be distributed to the other beneficiaries of the will dimin-
ished pro rata unless the will provides otherwise. 3 The usual result
of a dissent is to upset the will; and if the testator has not made an
alternative disposition in such case, the court really has to re-write the
will as near as may be in accordance with the testator's presumed in-
tent. 4 By majority rule the loss resulting from a dissent is made up by
abating other devises and bequests in accordance with the order of abate-
ment to pay debts, which rule generally saddles the residuary benefi-
ciaries with this burden. 6 This statute which is similar to the New
York statute adopts the fairer minority rule which abates pro rata all
devises and bequests regardless of their nature.65 a Where the renounced
interest is a life estate acceleration of future interests dependent upon
it or its sequestration may occur to compensate the losers.60
When the survivor dissents and thereby elects to take his intestate
share as provided by the act, several situations causing difficulty have
arisen. Usually the renounced interest of the dissenter is sequestered
to compensate disappointed beneficiaries, 67 but when this interest is
intestate the dissenter is usually not allowed to share in it because the
specified forced share is all that the law gives him." And when the
testator dies partially intestate some courts similarly refuse to allow the
dissenter to participate, while others permit it because it is genuine
intestate property.69 When the testator is donee of a power of appoint-
ment which he exercises by his will in favor of the dissenter, strict
application of the principle that taking against the will bars all interest
thereunder would prevent him from taking.70 But application of the
dogma that the appointee takes from the donor and not from the donee,
who does not own the property but has only a power over it, should
permit the dissenter to take.71
5. Election of a Life Estate in Lieu of the Intestate Share
The history and general effect of this legislation have heretofore been
discussed, and it remains to point out some of the details as set forth in
"N.C. GEx. STAT. §30-3(c) (Supp. 1959).
" See generally ATINSON, Wm.Ls, § 33 (2d ed. 1953).0
"Annot., Who Must Bear the Loss Occasioned by Election Against a Will,
36 A.L.R.2d 291 (1954).
"'In re Byrnes' Estate, 149 Misc. 449, 267 N.Y.S. 627 (Surr. Ct. 1933), 47
HARv. L. REv. 889 (1934).
" Baptist Female College v. Borden, 132 N.C. 476, 44 S.E. 47 (1903) ; RESTATE-
MENT, PROPERTY §§ 231-33 (1940).
6 ATKINSON, op. cit. supra note 64, § 33.
z Shoup v. Shonp, 319 Ill. 179, 149 N.E. 746 (1925).
"Blatt v. Blatt, 79 Colo. 57, 243 Pac. 1099 (1926).
In re Kates' Estate, 282 Pa. 417, 128 Atl. 97 (1925).
7 See Hoddy's Estate, 236 Pa. 276, 84 Atl. 909 (1909).
[VCOL 39
1960] ELECTION, DISSENT AND RENUNCIATION 35
the statute.72 It is so similar to dower, both substantively and proce-
durally, that one might say the act buries dower with one hand and
resurrects it with the other. Having abolished both dower and curtesy
and substituted for them as to the surviving spouse a forced absolute
share in the decedent's estate protected by the right of dissent, the act
then creates a life estate analogous to dower as an elective alternative to
the forced share, whether the decedent spouse dies testate or intestate.
In several states there is similar legislation under which the forced share
in fee simple and the life estates of dower and curtesy exist side by side,
and upon dissent the surviving spouse is permitted to elect the life estate
of dower or curtesy in lieu of the forced absolute share ;73 but some limit
this election to the widow.7 4
Under such a system the survivor who is otherwise qualified to dis-
sent has three choices: (1) take the interest, if any, given by the will;
(2) dissent and take the forced share of the decedent's estate, or (3) dis.-
sent and elect a life estate instead of the forced share. This triple
election is created by our act in favor of the surviving spouse who
dissents from the decedent's will. The first election is exercised by
allowing six months to elapse from the date of probate of the will with-
out filing a dissent with the clerk of the court; the second by so filing
a dissent and the third by both so dissenting and also filing with the clerk
of the court within six months of the decedent's death a notice of and
petition for the elective life estate in the decedent's real property in lieu of
the forced share of the estate. Where the decedent dies intestate only a
double election exists, which reduces his choices to (1) the intestate
share or (2) the elective life estate in lieu of the intestate share.
Some features of this elective life estate include: (a) the interest
exists as an inchoate right in all fee simple estates owned by either spouse
during the coverture and may be barred only by joinder in the other's
conveyance; (b) regardless of any excess value above a one-third inter-
est in the decedent's real estate the survivor's life estate "shall include"
the decedent's usual dwelling "and the lands upon which situated and
reasonably necessary to the use and enjoyment thereof," and the fee
simple ownership of the household furnishings; (c) it must be formally
elected within six months after the decedent's death by notice and petition
to the clerk of the superior court, with failure so to elect constituting an
absolute waiver of the right of election; (d) it is allotted by a jury of
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §29-30 (Supp. 1959); authorities cited notes 28 and 43
supra.
"Iu.. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 168 (Smith-Hurd 1941) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 45,
§§ 6, 7, art 93, § 314 (1957); see MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 189, § 1, ch. 191, § 15
(1955). See generally 1 AmERiCAN LAW OF PROPERTY, op. cit. supra note 54,
§§ 5.42, .74; 3 VERNER, AmERICAx FAmILy LAw §§ 189 (dower), 216 (curtesy)
(1935).
"1FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 131.34, .35 (1955); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-101,.-103(1952); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 469.010, .020, .070, .090, .120, .130, .150 (1949).
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three, and a certified copy of the report must be recorded in the register
of deeds office in each county where in the land lies; and (e) it is not
subject to debts of the decedent's estate other than a purchase money
mortgage or deed of trust.
The similarities of this interest to dower are striking, and the body
of prior statutory law and interpretative decisions thereon should prove
useful with regard to this legislation.7r Like the homestead laws of
most states, its basic purpose is to insure the homeplace against the
testamentary caprices, sole conveyances and debts of the owning spouse.
This immunity of the dwelling house and its land and furnishings from
estate debts during the survivor's lifetime often will by its inclusion of
all the decedent's property save a household from break-up and financial
ruin upon the death of the provider. However, this continuation of
the dower system will necessarily result in some clog on the marketa-
bility of real estate.
Whether the surviving spouse's choice involves the double election
or the triple election it may not always be easy, and the deciding factors
will necessarily vary from case to case. But they will generally include
such matters as the kind and amount of the estates assets; whether they
are realty or personalty; the amount and nature of the estate debts;
whether prior conveyances and mortgages of the owner's real estate were
made with the survivor's joinder except that a purchase money mort-
gage binds the property without such joinder; the separate property and
other income of the survivor; estate and inheritance taxes; nature and
condition of the dwelling house and land used in connection with it; the
status and personal desires of the surviving family; and the provisions
of the will in cases of testacy.
The orthodox common law election concept involves a choice by a
legatee or devisee between the will's provision for him and some in-
consistent or alternative claim, when he cannot have both, such as a
devise of his property to another,76 or the bequest to another of an in-
surance policy of which he is the beneficiary,7 7 or a bequest to a creditor
"See especially N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 30-3 to -7, -12, -13 (1950) [30-3: N.C.
Laws 1791, ch. 35, § 4, as amended; -4: N.C. Pub. Laws 1871-72, ch. 193, § 44: -5:
N.C. Laws 1827, ch. 46, as amended; -6; N.C. Pub. Laws 1868-69, ch. 93, § 35; -7:
N.C. Sess. Laws 1945, ch. 73, § 1; -12: N.C. Pub. Laws 1868-69, ch. 93, §§ 40, 41, as
amended, N.C. Pub. Laws 1891, ch. 133, as amended, N.C. Sess. Laws 1945, ch. 116;
-13: N.C. Pub. Laws 1868-69, ch. 93, § 42, as amended, N.C. Pub. Laws 1893, ch.
314, as amended, N.C. Pub. Laws 1931, ch. 393, as amended, N.C. Pub. Laws 1939,
ch. 3391, for similarities to dower. As to protection of household articles, see ARiz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-513 (1956) ; MicH. ComP. LAws § 702.93 (1948) ; Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 474.250 (1956) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-3 (1950) [N.C. Sess. Laws 1945, ch.
73, § 8]. As to what a homesite may include, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-8 (1950)[N.C. Sess. Laws 1945, ch. 73, § 2]; Boyd v. Brooks, 197 N.C. 644, 150 S.E. 78
(1929.).
6 Materials cite supra notes 2-3b.
T Royal v. Moore, 187 N.C. 379, 121 S.E. 666 (1924); cf. Commercial Nat'l
Bank v. Meisenheimer, 211 N.C. 519, 191 S.E. 14 (1937).
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in satisfaction of a debt.77a This statute broadens the concept by giving
the surviving spouse a right of election of a life estate analogous to dower
which includes the family dwelling as between both his share on an
intestacy and his forced share in case of a dissent. And whereas the
common law required no particular form of election and only required
it to be made within a reasonable time, this statute compels the election
to be made in the form of a legal proceeding and within six months of
the decedent's death.77b Generally the surviving spouse who is required
to make an election must take notice of the necessity for election without
any citation, and failure properly to elect as required is 'conclusively
'deemed to waive the right except in cases of judicial extension of time
or of fraud.7
RENUNCIATION
General American and North Carolina law prior to July 1, 1960
It is a principle of Anglo-American law that no one can have prop-
erty thrust upon him against his will. This has been picturesquely put
as follows: "A man cannot have an estate put into him in spight of his
teeth."' 79 To this rule there is the one well recognized common law ex-
ception that an heir cannot by disclaimer or renunciation prevent prop-
erty from descending to him on an intestacy because it occurs by force
of law and not by any act of the ancestor or heir.8s By a somewhat
ambiguously worded statute enacted, in 1953 this common law rule was
so changed in this state as to permit a distributee of intestate personal
property to renounce.8 '
Neither by deed nor will can one force a gift of property upon
another against his will. As to a deed this result is rationalized by the
requirement of an acceptance by the grantee, but as to wills different
theories are utilized to explain the recognized right of a devisee or lega-
tee to renounce and thereby refuse a gift. Sometimes it is said that
acceptance is necessary to a transfer by will and a renunciation consti-
tutes a refusal to accept, or that title passes subject to defeasance by
disclaimer. Under the first theory renunciation is seen as preventing
the vesting of an interest, while in the second it is regarded as the
", See generally ATKINSON, op. cit. supra note 64, § 133.
'
T N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-30 (Supp. 1959).
" In re Stitzer's Estate, 103 Colo. 529, 87 P2d 875 (1932) ; Dauh's Estate, 205
Pa. 446, 157 AtI. 908 (1932); see McGehee v. McGehee, 189 N.C. 558, 127 S.E.
684 (1925); In re Will of Shuford, 164 N.C. 133, 80 S.E. 420 (1913); Bell v.
Wilson, 41 N.C. 1 (1849); Craven v. Craven, 17 N.C. 339 (1833).
11 Thompson v. Leach, 2 Vent. 198, 86 Eng. Rep. 391, 396 (K.B. 1869) (Ven-
tris, J., dissenting).
o Hardenberg v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
836 (1952) ; Coomes v. Finnegan, 233 Iowa 448, 7 N.W.2d 729 (1943) ; Bostian v.
Milens, 239 Mo. App. 555, 193 S.W.2d 797, 170 A.L.R. 424 (1946) ; see Perkins v.
Isley, 224 N.C. 793, 32 S.E.2d 588, 23 N.C.L. REv. 380 (1945).81N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-149(13) (Supp. 1959); see A Survey of Statutory
Changes in North Carolina in 1953, 31 N.C.L. Rnv. 375, 376 (1953).
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divestment of a previously acquired interest.8 2 But whatever its theory,
renunciation is regarded as a process which prevents a succession from
occurring in favor of the renouncer, rather than his conveyance of an
"interest to the person who takes the renounced property as a result of
the renunciation. 8
Renunciations generally result from attempts to accomplish such
objectives as the following: (1) to keep creditors of the heir or devisee
from taking the property; (2) to reduce estate or inheritance taxes;
(3) to avoid burdens attached to the devise by the will; (4) to dissent
from the will and take another interest.8 Since a renunciation results
in the failure ab initio of the devise or legacy by majority rule it generally
prevents the creditors of the renouncer from reaching the property or the
imposition of a succession tax by the state or federal government.8 5 But
it has been held that since this immunity from debt depends upon the fic-
tion of relation back it should not in justice be allowed to defeat the lien
of a judgment creditor and the Model Probate Code provides that a
"renunciation shall be subject to the rights of creditors of the heir or
devisee and of the taxing authorities."' 6 It is settled that one may not
accept part and renounce part of an entire gift though couched in the
form of two devises; but as to severable gifts most courts permit it.87
However, a few courts say they do not recognize partial renunciation
even if the gifts are separate and distinct.8 8
At common law a renunciation need not be made in any particular
form because it was not a conveyance,8 9 nor within any fixed time since
a reasonable time was allowed. 90 As to the effect of a renunciation it
has heretofore been.pointed out in connection with the topic of dissent
that when a surviving spouse renounces by filing a dissent, the taking
of her statutory share generally increases her portion of the estate and
upsets the will by diminishing and distorting estate assets available for
8Did not vest-Hart v. Mumford, 27 F. Supp. (N.D. Pa. 1939) ; Bradford v.
Calhoun, 120 Tenn. 53, 109 S.W. 502 (1907). Divested-Hardesty v. Carrothers,
31 F. Supp. 365 (N.D. W. Va. 1940) ; In re Estate of Kalt, 16 Cal.2d. 807, 108
P.2d 401, 133 A.L.R. 1424 (1941).
" Perkins v. Isley, 224 N.C. 793, 32 S.EX2d 588, 23 N.C.L. REV. 380 (1945);
A IxNsoN, op. cit. supra note 64, § 139, 4 PAGE, WILLS §§ 1401-05 (3d ed. 1941).
S3 AwERIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 14.15 (Casner ed. 1952).8 Debt-Schoonover v. Osborne, 193 Iowa 474, 187 N.W. 20, 27 A.L.R. 465
(1922), noted in 36 HARv. L. REv. 347 (1923). Taxes-People v. Flanagan, 331
Ill. 203, 162 N.E. 848, 60 A.L.R. 305 (1928), noted in 38 .YALE L.J. 549 (1929).
" MODEL PROBATE CODE, at 86 (Simes 1946) ; see In re Estate of Kalt, 16 Cal2d
807, 108 P.2d 401, 133 A.L.R. 1424 (1949), noted in 29 CALir. L. REv. 531 (1944).
" Severable-State Banking Co. v. Hinton, 178 Ga. 68, 172 S.E. 42, 91 A.L.R.
596 (1933). Entire-Waggon'er v. Waggoner, 111 Va. 325, 68 S.E. 990 (1910).
"Bailey v. McLain, 215 N.C. 150, 1 S.E.2d 372, 120 A.L.R. 1487 (1939).
Defreese v. Lake, 109 Mich. 415, 67 N.W. 505 (1806) ; Perkins v. Isley, 224
N.C. 793, 32 S.E2d 588, 23 N.C.L. REv. 380 (1945).
" Matter of Wilson, 298 N.Y. 398, 83 N.E2d 852, 47 MicH. L. REv. 806 (1949).
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the other legatees and devisees.91 However, renunciation by other
beneficiaries than the surviving spouse of the testator generally produces
only a distortion of the will, and the renounced gift arguments pro tanto
the shares or interests of other legatees or devisees, or passes by
intestacy. 92
As the law of this state stood after the enactment of the above-
mentioned 1953 statute, and prior to its repeal on July 1, 1960, testate
real and personal property could be renounced, but only intestate per-
sonal property was the subject of renunciation. Though the broadness
of the language of the statute permitting renunciation by "the heirs at
law or any of them or any person entitled to receive any benefits from
said estate" could indicate a legislative intent to permit both the heir
and distributee "to renounce or disclaim," it occurs only in the law
relating to distribution of personal property. To date it does not seem
to have been judicially construed. It applied only to intestate succession
and prescribed no formalities for a renunciation but provided that it
shall occur "before said estate has been settled and before they have
received any part thereof."9 3 This clause may simply re-state the com-
mon law rule that renunciation must occur before acceptance94 with the
addition that the maximum period for a renunciation cannot extend
beyond settlement of the estate. Since acceptance is presumed if a gift
is beneficial, mere inaction often forecloses renunciation by lapse of
time.95
North Carolina law subsequent to July 1, 1960
Renunciation takes three different forms: (1) renunciation by the
surviving spouse who dissents from the decedent spouse's will; (2) re-
nunciation by any other legatee or devisee of a will; and (3) renuncia-
tion by an heir of intestate property. The Intestate Succession Act
applies only to (1) and (3), and therefore should not directly affect the
law of this State relating to (2). The principal changes of the law of
dissent effected by this act having been previously set forth, it remains
to discuss its changes in the law relating to renunciation of intestate
property.
The principal purpose of this legislation is to permit intestate real
and personal property to be renounced by the heir, and thereby erase
"See Blackwood v. Blackwood, 237 N.C. 726, 76 S.E2d 122 (1953) ; Neill v.
Bach, 231 N.C. 391, 57 S.E2d 385 (1950) ; 4 PAGE, op. cit. supra note 83, §§ 1389-91.
"Perkins v. Isley, 224 N.C. 793, 32 S.E2d 588, 23 N.C.L. REV. 380 (1945);
Privott v. Graham, 214 N.C. 199, 198 S.E. 635 (1938); 3 AmRIcAN LAW OF
PR PERTY §§ 21.43 to .46 (Casner ed. 1952).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-149(13) (a) (Supp. 1959); see A Survey of Statutory
Changes in North Carolina in 1953, 31 N.C.L. REv. 375, 376 (1953).
" Perkins v. Isley, 224 N.C. 793, 32 S.E.2d 588, 23 N.C.L. Rnv. 380 (1945).
" See Bacon v. Barber, 110 Vt. 280, 6 A.2d 9, 123 A.L.R. 253 (1939).
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the anomalies resulting from the old common law rules allowing legatees
and devisees to renounce while refusing to accord the same privilege
to heirs and next of kin. Whatever the original basis of this distinction,
there seems no good reason for its perpetuation at the present time. As
previously indicated, this purely technical and unrealistic distinction has
subjected an heir's inheritance to the claims of his creditors; and com-
pelled him to pay a succession or gift tax on intestate property which
he has refused, while a legatee or devisee could renounce and avoid both
burdens. Also, state variations in renunciation law may produce dif-
ferences in the application of federal tax lawsY8
This act specifies in detail both the mechanics and effects of a re-
nunciation as follows: (1) permits an heir to renounce his intestate
share, in whole or in part; (2) requires the renunciation to be (a)
signed and acknowledged by the heir, (b) within one year of the death
of the intestate, (c) delivered to the clerk of the superior court of the
county in which the administrator or collector qualifies, and (d) re-
corded in the office of the register of deeds of each county wherein any
land lies which is affected by the renunciation; (3) provides that (a) the
renunciation is retroactive to the date of the intestate's death, and (b)
the renounced property passes under this act as if the renouncer had
died immediately prior to the intestate.97
. Under the terms of this act when a surviving spouse refuses to take
under the will and an heir refuses an inheritance, both in effect renounce,
but some material details vary. For example, a dissent must occur
within six months of the will's probate, whereas the maximum period
for renouncing intestate property is one year from the intestate's death;
a dissent may be by authorized attorney, or by guardian or next friend
of one non sui juris, but no similar representation provisions occur as
to renunciation by an heir; and apparently a dissent must be both wit-
nessed and acknowledged while a renunciation requires only signature
and acknowledgment.9" Since the act seems to be mandatory both the
methods provided for an heir's renunciation and a surviving spouse's
renunciation by dissent are exclusive and must be complied with at least
substantially, but acceptance may occur by inaction.99 However, renun-
ciation of a legacy or devisee by any beneficiary other than a surviving
spouse who dissents is governed by the common law.
Only by experience and continued analysis of the act can its good
"~Authority cited supra notes 80, 85; see Rogers & Sterling, Post Mortem
Estate Planning, 14 U. Pnr. L. REv. 224 (1953). See generally ATKINSoN, op. cit.
supra note 64, § 139.
"
7N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-10 (Supp. 1959).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-10, 30-1 to -3 (Supp. 1959).
"See Perkins v. Isley, 224 N.C. 793, 32 S.E.2d 588, 23 N.C.L. REV. 389 (1945);
Hinton v. Hinton, 28 N.C. 274 (1846) ; cases cited note 78, supra; 4 PAGE, op. cit.
supra note 83, §§ 1374, 1378, 1406-09.
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and bad features be disclosed. As to renunciation by an heir it has
already been observed that certain inequitable results may occur under
the terms of the act. For example, an heir might mortgage his share
of the property and later, within the one year period allowed, renounce
his rights to the estate; or by renouncing an heir could place his repre-
sentatives in a position to receive a larger share of the estate than the
heir himself could have received. As to these, appropriate amendments
of the act will be proposed by the General Statutes Commission.
